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Abstract 
This paper takes issue with approaches that relate realist political theology exclusively back to 
its Schmittian and neo-orthodox roots. While not entirely denying those influences, it argues 
that realist thought is more accurately described as rooted in the tensions characterising 
Augustine’s anti-heretic diatribes rather than taking inspiration from Schmittian political 
theology or the ‘Gnostic’ tendencies in Protestant neo-orthodox theology. Augustine’s 
refutation of both the Manichean Gnostic and the Pelagian solutions to the problem of evil 
gave rise to a complex understanding of the relationship between human free will and 
original sin based on a combination of ontological monism and ethical dualism. Building on 
this heritage, realists can be read as rehearsing Augustine’s ambiguous gesture of overcoming 
Gnosticism with equally uncertain success. In responding to the modern ‘Gnostic’ challenge in 
terms that recognised the dialectical tension between ontological monism and ethical dualism, 
realists such as Morgenthau and Niebuhr should rather be seen as direct heirs of Augustine’s 
ambivalent orthodoxy rather than Schmitt’s unorthodox, semi-‘Gnostic’ Catholicism. This 
intellectual legacy may, then, explain their abhorrence to purist positions in politics –be it 
quietism, pacifism or, their opposite, political messianism- and adherence to an anti-‘Gnostic’ 
pragmatism grounded on the tensions of Augustinian theology.    
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Introduction 
 
In a recent article on how International Relations (IR) theory emerged in the early 
‘50s as a critique of secularism in the social sciences, Nicolas Guilhot (2010) makes a 
powerful argument in favour of realigning mid-twentieth century political realism 
with its theological roots. Guilhot puts forward a well-argued case of realism 
representing the theological moment in the history of International Relations albeit 
one that was quite short-lived and destined to succumb to the forces of secularisation 
in the guise of behavioralism. However, when it comes to outlining the lineages 
underpinning realist political theology, Guilhot identifies three: the rise of 
Protestant neo-orthodoxy as a reaction to liberal Christianity, the wave of mid-
century Augustinianism and, last but not least, the inspiration offered by Carl 
                                                 
1 I am thankful to Nick Rengger, Tony Lang and three anonymous reviewers of this journal for their 
insightful comments and to Michael C. Williams for his advice to build the argument of this paper on 
a rebuttal of Guilhot’s article. The remaining mistakes are mine. 
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Schmitt’s critique of liberal modernity. Indeed, it is the latter influence he deems 
more important as it reveals what he calls the ‘Teutonic forest’ behind the tree of 
Protestant neo-orthodoxy and political Augustinianism: ‘Schmitt’s political 
theology… represented a strand of Catholic conservatism that resonated with the 
ideological program of Protestant neo-orthodoxy’ (Guilhot 2010, 226).  
 
It is this latter sweeping and rather misleading claim that this paper wants to take 
issue with. Although the argument for excavating twentieth century political 
realism’s theological pedigree is both plausible and compelling,2 Guilhot seems to 
establish too strong a connection between Schmittian political theology, neo-
orthodox theology and political realism. Undeniably, as Roger Epp (1991; 2003) has 
amply shown, realist thought was fundamentally inspired by Augustine’s 
pronouncements on human nature, morality and politics; yet, the connection 
between realist political theology and Protestant neo-orthodoxy or Schmitt’s 
idiosyncratic Catholicism is not as straightforward as Guilhot would like us to 
believe. To be sure, there are some common themes and concerns that seem to unite 
all three projects, such as the attack on liberal modernity, the re-appreciation of the 
role of religion in politics and the critique of anti-metaphysical positivism. However, 
realist thought, I argue, is rather firmly rooted in the ambiguities and tensions 
permeating Augustine’s theology than taking inspiration from Schmittian political 
theology or purist tendencies in Protestant neo-orthodox theology. In contrast to 
the reliance of Schmitt’s political theology (and to certain extent of Protestant neo-
orthodox theology) on ‘Gnostic’ themes, realist thought should be seen as a critique 
of ‘Gnosticism’ along the lines of Augustine’s opposition to ontologically dualist 
modes of thought.3  
 
In fact, this paper suggests that it is exactly the creative ambivalence between 
Augustinian ontological monism and ethical dualism4 that characterises the work of 
                                                 
2 Albeit not new, see Hermens (1958); for a focus on the Augustinian tradition in international 
relations, see Epp (1991; 2003). Particularly on Butterfield and Wight, see Thomas (2001), Hall 
(2006) and Pabst (2012). See also Jones (2003), for a critique of secularisation in the English School, 
Rossbach (1999) for an emphasis on George Kennan and Troy (2013) for a political theological 
treatment of the realist tradition.  
3 The use of inverted commas recognises the polysemy of a disputed term like ‘Gnosticism’ and the 
wars of interpretation surrounding its reconstructed use in modern times. The term ‘Gnosticism’ 
emerged in 18th century France and is usually employed to denote the Gnostic systems of the second 
and third centuries AD, particularly those of Basilides, Valentinus and Mani. The term gnostikos was 
conferred on those movements largely through Christian heresiomachs such as Irenaeus, Tertullian, 
Hippolytus and Epiphanius. Gnostic studies have enjoyed a renaissance since the discovery of ancient 
Gnostic texts at Nag Hammadi in 1945 but recent research on the history of late antiquity have taken 
issue with the term’s coherence. The term ‘Gnosis’ is known in Ancient Greek and Latin texts as 
opposed to the use of the term ‘Gnosticism’ which seems to be rather related with twentieth century 
religious and philosophical polemics than with its late antiquity referent. This latter use has prompted 
some to talk about Gnosticism as a ‘sick sign’ that includes everyone and no one under a single 
semantic umbrella (Lazier 2008, 32). In this article, I am closer to Jonas’ understanding of the term as 
conveying an attitude or stance (Daseinshaltung) toward human being and Gershom Scholem’s 
designation of ‘Gnosis’ as a reproducible structure in religious thought. Instead of a huge 
bibliography on the topic, see relevant discussions in Jonas (1992); Lazier (2008); Rossbach (1999); 
Williams (1996); King (2003). In this paper, the use of the term in inverted commas designates its 
contested use in modern times whereas, when used without, it is either taken to denote the ancient 
Gnostic movements or it is part of another thinker’s argument.      
4 The terms ‘ontological monism’ and ‘ethical dualism’ should not be interpreted literally as referring 
to ontological realities but rather as indices of experiences conveyed through the use of religious 
language (see Voegelin 1990; Ricoeur 1967). Ontological monism reflects the biblical belief that the 
world was created ‘very good’ (kala lian) (Genesis, 1:31) and that created nature includes both the 
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two of the most prominent realist thinkers, Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold 
Niebuhr. As I will show, Augustine’s refutation of both the Manichean Gnostic and 
the Pelagian solutions to the problem of evil gave rise to a complex understanding of 
the relationship between human free will and original sin based on a combination of 
ontological monism and ethical dualism. Building on this heritage, the realists can be 
read as rehearsing Augustine’s ambiguous gesture of overcoming Gnosticism with 
equally uncertain success. Indeed, I will argue that Morgenthau and Niebuhr 
exemplify in varying degrees this ambivalence in resisting the ‘Gnostic’ temptation, 
an enterprise that, truth be told, proved challenging even for Augustine himself. In 
responding, however, to the ‘Gnostic’ challenge in terms that recognised the 
dialectical tension between ontological monism and ethical dualism, realists should 
rather be seen as direct heirs of Augustine’s ambivalent orthodoxy rather than 
Schmitt’s peculiar, semi-‘Gnostic’ Catholicism. This intellectual legacy may, then, 
explain their abhorrence to purist positions in politics –be it quietism, pacifism or, 
their opposite, political messianism- and adherence to an anti-‘Gnostic’ pragmatism 
grounded on the tensions of Augustinian theology.    
 
Political theology and the ‘Gnostic’ temptation 
 
The main argument of this section is that in order to understand realism as an anti-
‘Gnostic’ political theology in all its tensions and permutations, one has to revisit the 
Germanic political theological discussions of the early and mid-twentieth century in 
which the question of whether modernity constitutes a break from theological habits 
of thought or not coincided with an acute post-war moral crisis. In the aftermath 
first of the First World War carnage and later of the Second World War genocidal 
horror, German-speaking intellectual circles were overwhelmed by a feeling of 
disenchantment with the liberal-secular character of modern German culture. 
Though this notion of a crisis of culture related to countless aspects of social life, 
German-speaking intellectuals endeavoured to identify the roots of the crisis and 
reach a comprehensive solution. Within the contours of this debate, theological ideas 
and controversies of the early Christian era were reconstructed to account for what 
went wrong with modernity. If the secularising process ended up in a ‘land of 
screams’, perhaps the wisdom contained in long-abandoned theological discourses 
could provide a clue as to why the idea of progress, among other liberal illusions, 
proved to be such a chimera.      
 
The debate was ignited by a thesis put forward in 1949 by the German-Jewish 
scholar Karl Löwith, a former student of Martin Heidegger. In his book published 
that year, entitled Meaning in History, Löwith (1949) defined modernity as 
secularised Christian theology. Löwith’s main thesis in that book was that the 
modern belief in progress is a direct extension of late medieval eschatology and, 
more concretely, a continuation of the eschatological philosophy of history of 
Joachim of Flora (Löwith 1949, 145-159). In challenging Augustine’s categorical 
disjunction between the historical world of mankind and the transcendent sphere of 
God, Joachim of Flora was, according to Löwith, the first to ascribe a redemptive 
end to the historical process as such. Löwith’s provocative thesis was essentially an 
endorsement of Carl Schmitt’s (2006, 36) earlier aphorism that ‘all significant 
                                                                                                                                            
material and the spiritual world ascribing ontological primacy to neither. Ethical dualism then is the 
doctrine that reads the introduction of evil and suffering in the world as a product of the human will 
which had as a result the denigration, yet not the destruction, of the ability of human nature to liken 
God.    
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concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularised theological concepts’. 
While Schmitt’s dictum, however, was attached to a critique of the juridification of 
what were essentially political matters, Löwith’s argument was pointing to human 
inability to overcome theology, not only because modern times emerged out of the 
medieval era but, more profoundly, because secularisation was nothing more than a 
‘transfiguration’ of Christian theology (Taubes 2004, 55) in modern semantics.  
 
What Löwith read as the mark of Christian eschatology in the heart of modernity, 
however, Eric Voegelin (1952: 107-32) was inclined to interpret as the expression of 
a Gnostic revival attempting ‘to give a “meaning” to the immanent course of history’ 
(cf. Hotam, 2007: 598). Reading the works of Joachim of Flora as Gnostic rather 
than Christian in character, Voegelin argued that the modern concept of progress is 
Gnostic to the extent that secularisation inflates the Gnostic concept of a true and 
hidden divine light within the human being and transposes it into the new worldly 
reality. Voegelin holds that this process of ‘immanentisation of transcendence’ -as he 
labelled the attribution of the qualities and features of the divine and sacred to the 
worldly and mundane- eventually leads to the re-divinisation of man itself and his 
worldly existence. By calling modernity a secularised Gnostic heresy, Voegelin 
condemned not only the modern liberal order but all forms of utopian or totalitarian 
politics as well, such as socialism, communism and fascism for projecting intra-
mundane salvific doctrines as ultimate truths. The predictable result is modern 
nihilism: the death of God and its replacement by man as the modern Prometheus5 
who brought the catastrophes of the twentieth century upon himself.  
 
Voegelin identified Prometheanism as the major fault of ‘Gnostic’ theology and, yet, 
the Luciferian sin defines only one aspect of ‘Gnostic’ dualism. The belief in human 
beings’ infinite potential is coupled with a correspondent utter disregard of the 
natural and historical world, in turn closely related to ‘Gnostic’ theodicy.6 The 
primary aspect of ‘Gnostic’ thought is a sharp dichotomy between a good 
transcendent God and an evil world which is the creation of a lesser malicious deity. 
As a result, ‘Gnosticism’ introduces a dualism of transcendence (God) and 
immanence (existence within this world), an irreconcilable division between the 
‘eternal’ and the ‘temporal’. Furthermore, given the dichotomy ‘true God vs. evil 
world’ (or between ‘eternity’ and ‘temporality’), true ‘Gnosis’ presupposes the 
alienation of the transcendent God from the world as we know it (Jonas 1992). The 
true transcendent God is a hidden and concealed divinity (Deus absconditus) who 
cannot be held responsible for the evil in the world as He is not the creator of the 
world; the world is believed to be the creation of a lesser and evil Godly power 
(demiurge), always at loggerheads with the one true transcendent Divine entity. 
Finally, ‘Gnostic’ anthropology transposes cosmic dualism onto the human being’s 
constitution itself. Human beings are torn between worldly existence and a divine 
and hidden inner essence, stranded between immanence and transcendence, the 
‘eternal’ and the ‘temporal’. Humanity’s mission according to ‘Gnosis’ is to reignite 
                                                 
5 Contra Voegelin, Hans Blumenberg, in his major work The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, challenged 
the designation of modernity as Gnostic. He found the Gnostic spirit revived in the nominalism and 
theological voluntarism of late medieval scholastic theology revolving around the abyssal 
omnipotence of a Deus Absconditus or hidden god. Whereas the first partially successful attempt at 
Gnosticism’s overcoming was Augustine’s work, the second, and for Blumenberg ‘final’ overcoming, 
was premised on the ontological revaluation of nature through an ethos of human ‘self-assertion’ best 
instantiated in the scientific program of Francis Bacon (see Blumenberg, 1985, 127-143). 
6 For a dissenting view that describes the criticisms of ‘Gnostic’ dualism as ‘Christian heresiophobia’, 
see the work of Arthur Versluis (2010; 2006) 
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the divine spark already dormant in human spirit by disassociating itself from 
worldly existence. The rejection of the world and temporality is absolute here. 
Disbelief in the world and estrangement from it are the symbol of the ‘Gnostic’ 
existential state of mind in its quest for self-revelation and redemption (Jonas 1992: 
320-40; see also Rossbach 1999). 
  
If ‘Gnostic’ theodicy is the key to understanding its otherworldliness, Voegelin is, 
then, probably wrong in attributing to ‘Gnosticism’ a tendency to ‘immanentise the 
eschaton’.7 According to this reading, ‘Gnosticism’ appears to abhor any effort to 
establish an earthly paradise as much as Christian eschatological reservations reject 
the possibility of any worldly power being identified with the Kingdom of God. The 
difference, of course, lies in the ‘Gnostic’ response to the problem of evil. As opposed 
to Christian monism that considers nature created good and thus ontologically 
predisposed to salvation, ‘Gnostic’ dualism locates the existence of evil in the world, 
or to be more precise, perceives the world as the evil that must be overcome (Jonas 
1992, 329). This part of ‘Gnostic’ legacy proved so powerful as to have exerted a 
compelling attraction not only to philosophical circles that were interested in the use 
of theological terms to describe the modern experience, but also among theological 
circles that struggled to formulate a Christian response to the appropriate 
relationship between faith and political engagement after the devastating experience 
of the First World War. The major figure of the neo-orthodox movement, Karl 
Barth (1968), flirted with aspects of the ‘Gnostic’ worldview, despite later 
repudiating them (Barth 1960, 46, 62). Barth’s Platonic assertion that God was 
absolutely separate from humanity sought to restore the certainty of meaning by 
removing its source from the changing and transitory world of humanity. Barth had 
reasons to mistrust the close association of the divine and the temporal realms. The 
theology of crisis, of which his was a prominent representative, sprung out of the 
critique of liberal Protestantism for establishing too intimate a connection between 
throne and altar. Barth’s idea of krisis was exactly the rejection of any human-
centred solutions to the ambiguities of history in the form of messianic ideologies 
pointing towards a heaven on earth and seeking to bring divine perfection into a 
fallible earth or bridge the gap between divine eternity and human time (Cremer 
1995: 294). While fighting the temptation to ‘immanentise the eschaton’ on the one 
hand, Barth’s almost absolute dichotomy between the divine (God as Deus 
absconditus) and the profane (temporality, human history) reintroduced the ‘Gnostic’ 
politics of purism, on the other (Lilla, 2007: 262). 
 
Yet, Barth’s refusal to sanction the social world begs the question of what makes a 
reformist theological movement such as neo-orthodoxy susceptible to the ‘Gnostic’ 
temptation. One has to revisit here the Pauline roots of the neo-orthodox revival. 
Indeed, Saint Paul, as it was said for his master Jesus Christ, has been a point of 
contention. The evocation of his legacy in religious thought and dogmatic history 
usually means trouble for institutional Christianity as his thought combines both the 
announcement of a new order and the self-revolutionising of that order (Critchley 
2012, 155). In Christian parlance, Paul attempts to work within the law, yet 
understood in its messianic transformation as something that conditions our relation 
with faith and redemption. Throughout history the Pauline message has been 
                                                 
7 In fact, this is an observation one of the most astute and sympathetic readers of Voegelin, Gregor 
Sebba, arrived at. Investigating the issue of the empirical validity of the continuity between ancient 
and modern forms of ‘Gnostic’ thought, Sebba concluded that what characterises ‘classical gnosis’ is 
exactly the ‘radical rejection of any immanentisation of transcendence’ (cf. Rossbach 2005, 106).  
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interpreted in various ways, either as legitimist to the ‘powers that be’ or as entirely 
antinomic, opposed to the order of being that represents man’s sinfulness and 
constitutive imperfection. The latter impulse has been the inspiration behind 
reactions against the secularism, corruption and scholasticism of the established 
Church towards the uncovering of the authentic core of Christianity. What usually 
happened when Paul was evoked was that the official church was recognised as the 
Whore of Babylon in need of reformation and realignment with the roots of true 
unalloyed faith. If the signifier ‘Paul’ denotes anything, that is the need for reformist 
action, the demand for activism and vigilance against complacent pietism or worldly 
powers and institutions that think of themselves well-grounded and secure in their 
legitimacy.  
 
In this context, Paul has been the inspiration for both heretics and reformers within 
the established Church. This is true of Marcion’s Gnostic critique of the Apostolic 
Fathers, Augustine’s response to Gnosticism and Pelagianism, and Luther after the 
Scholastics up to the neo-orthodox movement as a reaction to liberal Protestantism. 
The Pauline moment represents the spirit of reform and uncompromising return to 
the authentic core of faith. My purpose here is not to pit those that defend Paul’s 
orthodoxy against those who read him as a Christian Gnostic. But to point to how 
Paul’s uncompromising spirit and radical messianism can be seen as both reflecting 
and enacting the temptation of ontological dualism in religious thought. For Jonas, 
who detected a clear Gnostic vein in Paul, the problem with Pauline antinomianism 
was what he termed a tendency towards ‘de-worldification’ (Entweltlichung), a stance 
he collectively attributed to all modern day ‘Gnostics’, from Barth and neo-
orthodoxy up to Heidegger’s existentialism (Lazier 2008, 27-48). More specifically, a 
tendency in ‘Gnosticism’ to equate the Pauline ‘flesh’, that stood for anything 
worldly, with sin and, thereby, deprive humans of their prelapsarian or primordial 
grace. For Jonas, both Paul and later Augustine -who, in Jonas’ view, in his attack 
against the Pelagians failed to escape the Gnostic bind-, opted for the equation of 
human finitude (‘law’) with sin. As a result, any prospect of humans participating in 
their salvation through lawful piety (‘works’) was apriori excluded and what began 
as an ethical opposition between ‘flesh’ and ‘spirit’ was now turned into an 
unbridgeable rift between the world and divine grace. The point of this discussion is 
not to endorse Jonas’ take on Paul, Augustine or Barth. It is only partly that Paul’s 
own ambivalence can be held responsible here as it is also partly an inherent 
tendency in religious thought to slide towards dualistic categories of justification 
instead of maintaining the dialectical tension between the law, the order of being, 
immanence on the one side and love, the order of faith, transcendence on the other 
(Lilla 2007, 251-2). And Jonas does point here, albeit unintentionally (Lazier 2008, 
34), to a constant ‘Gnostic’ temptation in religious thought as the inability to sustain 
the dialectical paradox of religious experience and the tendency to fall back to 
ontological dualism in search for purity and security; what the theologian Johann 
Baptist Metz would describe as the “gnostische Dauerversuchung” (permanent 
Gnostic temptation) of the Church (Metz, 1988).          
 
As a reaction to religious conformism and ambiguity, this ‘Gnostic’ purism arises in 
two forms that converge in their dualistic orientation; either in the form of the 
naturalisation of original sin that attributes to human beings an ontological 
defectiveness or inherent predilection to wickedness, malice, violence and extreme 
cruelty. Or, its mirror image, in the form of utter disengagement from worldly 
affairs driven by a purist sentiment of disgust for the imperfection of civilisation. 
The former is a type of pessimism that is grounded on a nihilistic -and 
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fundamentally unchristian- rejection of human beings’ capacity for improvement 
through worldly engagement. The latter is a type of moralism that is grounded on 
the typically ‘Gnostic’ idea of an alienated world incapable of redemption. Both 
result in an essentially dualist anti-political purism that divest human being of any 
responsibility for changing the world or participating in its betterment. This idea, 
which relates back to a 2nd century AD Gnostic sect, Marcionism, is tempting yet 
potentially debilitating. It is tempting because it places responsibility for a defective 
world to a malevolent deity that has instilled corruption to the world, while 
exonerating human beings from the blame. It is also alluring because it rests on the 
idea of religion as pure faith that can detach itself from anything debased or 
degenerate in the real world and pursue individual perfection through a radical act of 
renewal and rebirth. Yet, it can be fatalistic as it ultimately relies not on a biblical 
expectation for the eschatological fulfilment of history but on a conception of 
theology as retreat from creation and a relation with a God that usurps individual 
responsibility for the evil in the world (see Critchley 2012, 202). Before moving to 
examine how the realism of Morgenthau and Niebuhr deals with the allures and 
perils of ‘Gnostic’ anti-cosmism, an investigation of Augustine’s struggle against the 
‘Gnostic’ temptation may further elucidate the theological legacy upon which realist 
political theology rests.    
 
Overcoming Gnosticism 1.0? Augustine’s incomplete dialectics 
 
The implications of the radical break between transcendence and immanence that 
‘Gnostic’ dualism announces has been the focus of Augustine’s struggle in his 
arduous efforts to differentiate orthodox theology from the heretical discourses of 
both Manichean Gnosticism and Pelagianism. Augustine laboured for nine years 
under the Gnostic doxas as the piety and asceticism of the Manicheans -the 
prevailing type of Gnosticism in his time- held a strong appeal for a spiritually 
tormented young man. The attraction of the Manichean doctrine rested in absolving 
both man and God from the responsibility for evil. Manichean Gnosticism hinges 
upon a feeling of incommensurability between the self and its world and expresses 
this in antagonistic dualisms. Evil is being embodied in an alien, hostile world. This 
dualism of self and world leads to the dualisms of soul and body, God and cosmos. 
The soul, exiled from the divine realm by reason of a pre-cosmic fall or error, is 
incarcerated in the body. Evil and finitude are one and the same. And yet, though 
sharing in evil, humans are not responsible for it, for ultimately evil is a second 
ontological principle over against the transcendent alien God. Thus, evil for 
Gnosticism is almost physical, a contagion infecting the person from without. This 
elaborate rationalised myth revealed inner man, the spirit, to be untarnished and a 
part of the divine substance eternally in battle with the external physical world 
which is the embodiment of evil. Man and God are not guilty for what is bad in the 
world but are both part of a cosmic redemptive scheme.  
 
Augustine fiercely attacked this doctrine that divided the human being between his 
soul and his body instilling an irreconcilable animosity between the two elements of 
its nature. If saving the innocence of the deity demanded rapturing the unity of 
cosmos and the human self, then the cost, for Augustine, was too high as it left 
humans alienated from the world and prevented them from experiencing the 
wholeness of their being: ‘but the whole was myself and what divided me against 
myself was my impiety’ (Augustine, 1998: 84). Augustine’s theory of sin was an 
attempt to defend this wholeness (Forsyth, 1987: 396). Human beings are created 
good and situated in a good creation as opposed to the Manichean and generally 
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Gnostic notion that matter itself is evil (DCD 11.22).8 Since being and good are 
primordial, evil can have no ontological status; it is not a being but the privation of 
being (privatio boni) (DCD 14.13). Hence, lacking an ontological foundation, it 
cannot be explained but only described as a free defection of the defectible human 
being from the order intended by the Creator (Duffy 1988, 599). Evil is turning 
away from God, the noblest good, and inordinately turning to the world and its 
volatile, finite goods. It is a self-defeating denial of any authority but the absolutised 
self. Desire, a natural tendency, becomes, after the Fall, enslaving concupiscence -a 
technical term used by Augustine to describe the inordinate desire. Sin is a self-
imposed shackling that follows upon our misplaced love for the finite instead of the 
infinite (DCD 14.4).  
 
In defending such anthropology, Augustine strove to eschew both the pessimism of 
Manichean Gnosticism and the optimism of Pelagianism. Against the Manicheans he 
maintained that evil is not identifiable with human finitude. It erupts freely, 
contingently, and not by ontological necessity. Theologically, he came to see that 
Gnostic dualism is unchristian. The root of evil is the dark misuse of the created gift 
of freedom, the unravelling of what God had made rather than a tainted nature 
which is the consequence of sin. The original sin marks a clear separation between 
the theological genesis of being and the anthropological genesis of evil. With the 
state of original righteousness forfeited by a historical first sin, Augustine negated 
the Gnostic coincidence of evil with finitude the same time he rescued the Greek and 
Biblical sense of the created beauty of the universe and the goodness of the material 
of which it is made.  The human is the point where evil emerges in the world. 
Augustine's is an ethical vision of evil; humans are integrally responsible. His is not 
the tragic vision where humans are not actors but victims of a wicked God (see 
Ricoeur 1974). 
 
Against the Pelagians, on the other hand, Augustine maintained that sin is not 
merely accidental or purely contingent. Pelagian voluntarism went further 
maintaining that freedom is indeterminacy. We basically enter the world from the 
womb neutral, argued Pelagius, without virtue, but also without vice and can opt for 
either as we freely weave our life story (Duffy 1988, 601). If sin is voluntary by 
definition, then humans must be capable of not sinning. Though sin is widespread, it 
is not a universal condition of humankind. Moral perfection must be a human 
possibility otherwise that would violate the condition of our God-given freedom and 
a just God cannot demand the unreasonable. Adam corrupted only himself, not his 
posterity. He set a bad example which is widely followed; hence an evil influence is 
socially transmitted as habit or custom. Nonetheless, sin is neither inevitable nor 
universal. Finally, evil acts do not alter or destroy the ontological condition of 
human freedom; its indeterminacy or neutrality in the face of good and evil is intact. 
Impotency before the power of sin is a cowardly rationalisation.  Augustine could 
not live with the simplistic Pelagian reduction of sin to a conscious, free choice of 
evil. Universal in its range, though not synonymous with or a structure of essential 
humanity, it nevertheless appears as a kind of ‘second nature’, a positive propensity 
to evil. Corruption of human nature by sin entails a predisposition to evil, a bias 
toward it, which precedes and forms choice. In virtue of the Fall, this dispositional 
bias is universal obliging the human will to a kind of pre-volitional bondage.  
 
                                                 
8 References to Augustine’s City of God (De Civitate Dei) are from Dods’ (1950) translation. 
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Unlike Pelagius, Augustine saw that freedom has an acquired nature, for it is 
encumbered by habit and history. In this he echoed Paul and anticipated Luther. 
Obviously, such a position gives rise to problems. Augustine appears to undermine 
his own anthropological explanation of evil when to counter the Pelagian excesses 
concedes that sin is a hereditary taint biologically transmitted.9 For Duffy (1988, 
607), the apparent contradiction between responsibility and inevitability appears 
largely due to Augustine's mixture of categories: a juridical category of debt, which 
concerns deliberate and therefore punishable acts, and a biological category of 
inheritance, which concerns species unity through propagation. Augustine directed 
the juridical category against the Manicheans, as he insisted on the separation of the 
beginning of creation from the beginning of evil, and the biological category against 
the Pelagians, as he insisted on a pre-volitional solidarity in evil grounded in 
procreation, which, of course, awakened the ancient associations, dormant in archaic 
layers of consciousness, between stain and sexuality. Thus the doctrine appeared 
incoherent, though its central insight -that the bondage of the heart to evil is self-
imposed and that freedom and inevitability, individuality and solidarity are 
paradoxically related rather than starkly contradictory- is profound. Eventually, the 
stock explanation of inherited guilt and corruption resulting from the inclusion of all 
of us in Adam's loins made the classical doctrine hard to distinguish from its Gnostic 
rival, for sin came to appear as an intrinsic and inescapable dimension of the human 
condition for which no one is or can be liable.  
 
That said, the brilliance of Augustine's insight enables us to see that two types of 
language have to be held in paradoxical tension in speaking of evil as both moral and 
tragic: that of freedom and that of inevitability, contingency and universality, 
responsibility and inescapability. This double negation of Manichaeism and 
Pelagianism would lead Augustine to the classical doctrine of original sin with its 
three pivotal points: original perfection, original sin, and original guilt. However, his 
battle against Pelagianism pushed Augustine to the bitter end in developing the 
notion of original sin. If creation and fall are not temporally separated as before and 
after, how distinguish the origin of creation from the origin of evil or sin from 
finitude? How sever the link between a historical fall and the corruption of human 
nature without surrendering to a Pelagian naiveté that sees humanity as always the 
same and poised indifferently before good and evil? Conversely, how concede evil’s 
irreducibility without going over to Manichaeism? Augustine never ceased to 
struggle with the implications of this paradox. As it is beautifully put by Neil 
Forsyth (1987, 408), ‘until he could understand the structure of his life and its 
relationship to the structure of sin and grace, of light and darkness, that operates 
everywhere and at once, he was always in danger either of Pelagian optimism or 
Manichean pessimism’.  
 
It is no coincidence then that in the history of ideas Augustine was accused of failing 
to overcome both Gnosticism and Pelagianism. For Hans Jonas, Augustine fell to 
the Pelagian argument in his failure to preserve a purified realm of grace, separated 
absolutely from the state of law; it was a failed attempt at dualism, misguided from 
the outset (Lazier 2003, 630). For Hans Blumenberg (1985, 135-6), Augustine failed 
to overcome Gnosticism because he displaced the Gnostic dualism of worldly and 
transcendent into the dualism of damned and saved, the ‘absolute separation of the 
                                                 
9
 See here Julian’s of Eclanum objection that Augustine is confusing a matter of morals (the will’s 
determination of good and evil deeds) with an issue of biology (the creation of sperm): ‘Qui fieri potest 
ut res arbitrii conditioni seminum misceatur?’ (Augustine, Augustine, 1865, 837) 
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elect from the rejected.’ What both Jonas and Blumenberg failed to register was that 
while Augustine did propagate a form of ethical dualism that haunted political 
theology ever since in the form of the ‘Doctrine of the Two’ (Kirwan 2008, 55), his 
avowed solution to the problem of evil and human sinfulness explicitly rejected 
Gnostic ontological dualism. However, Jonas’ and Blumenberg’s reactions reveal 
how fragile holding an ethical as opposed to ontological differentiation between an 
earthly and a heavenly city would prove to be. The twin ‘Gnostic’ temptations of 
either purist retreat from a denigrated world or an eschatological outbreak of 
political messianism ceaselessly loom in the background.    
 
Morgenthau, Schmitt and the ‘Gnostic’ temptation 
 
It is exactly this grappling with the ambivalence of holding an ontological monist 
doctrine while advocating ethical dualism that one discerns in the writings of realist 
thinkers who have struggled with the paradox of the human condition such as Hans 
Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr. Early realist thought, as it is expressed in the 
work of those thinkers, seems to be soberly conscious of the pathological structure of 
existence (man’s propensity to evil) while eschewing any facile slide to cynicism and 
meaninglessness. At the same time, however, Niebuhr and Morgenthau are not 
equally susceptible to the ‘Gnostic’ temptation. Morgenthau seems to be closer to a 
‘Gnostic’-like dichotomous sensibility that may perhaps be traced back to a peculiar 
mix of Nietzschean scepticism and Kantian transcendentalism in his thought.10 
Niebuhr, on the other hand, remains faithful to the Augustinian tradition with a 
twist that seeks to dissociate it from traces of ‘Gnostic’ or neo-orthodox other-
worldliness.  
 
Morgenthau’s ambivalent mood is most characteristically depicted in his reading of 
the tragedy of human condition that is inextricably linked to his Nietzschean 
(Neacsu 2010; Frei, 2001) and Weberian-like (Pichler 1998) diagnosis of the ‘death 
of God’ and disenchantment in late modern, post-metaphysical societies. The 
capacity to rationally discover an ultimate foundation upon which to construct an 
unshakable meaning of the world is no longer available and men must learn to ‘meet 
under an empty sky from which the gods have departed’ (Morgenthau 1967, 249). 
However, simultaneously Morgenthau does not fail to notice that humanity’s 
irretrievably lost ability to ascribe a stable meaning to the world does not 
necessarily lead to a despairing nihilism. In a typically Nietzschean manner 
(Nietzsche 2006, 67), he believes that the indeterminacy and uncertainty ensuing the 
irrecoverable loss of humanity’s innocence and security after the collapse of religious 
and metaphysical certainties may be seen as a liberating development allowing 
human beings to re-activate their dormant potentialities (‘vitalities’ as he calls them) 
(Neacsu 2010, 53; Williams 2004, 649; Tjalve 2008).  
 
Morgenthau is inspired by a near-Heideggerian (Spegele 2009) philosophical 
sensibility that refuses to reduce the rich and complex texture of experience to the 
cognitive demands of humanity’s epistemic will to power. In Scientific Man vs. Power 
Politics, Morgenthau (1946) attacks rationalism exactly because in its certainty for 
the attainability of fulfilment and perfection it violates the meaningfulness of life in 
its entirety by compressing the whole of human experience into a system. 
Morgenthau recognises in this the tragedy of the human condition. Humans are 
driven by the will to ascribe meaning to their social existence but social reality 
                                                 
10
 See, here, Frei (2001), Petersen (1999) and Paipais (2014). 
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cannot answer the riddles of existence as it stands as a constant reminder of human 
being’s impotence to embrace the totality of experience. Meaningful action is always 
gained at the expense of our infinite desire. In Morgenthau’s (1946, 221) language, 
the statesman -who is the prototype of social man-, is forever stranded between 
‘what he needs and wants and what he is able to obtain’: 
 
Suspended between his spiritual destiny which he cannot fulfil and his animal nature 
in which he cannot remain, he is forever condemned to experience the contrast 
between the longings of his mind and his actual condition as his personal, eminently 
human tragedy. 
  
Despite its heroic tone or, rather, because of it, the problem with this understanding 
of the relationship between human desire (freedom) and necessity is that it postulates 
an unbridgeable gap between transcendence and immanence. This is more than 
evident in Morgenthau’s wholesale embracement of the Pascalian sensibility that 
views human beings as always oscillating between the inexorable determinism of 
nature and their ability to transcend finitude (Morgenthau 1946, 223). His target 
here is rationalist monism and its tendency to reduce human agency to the 
determinism of discoverable laws. Yet, he runs the risk of erecting an unbridgeable 
chasm between a fallen reality and the human ability to transcend it which comes 
perilously close to the Augustinian wrestling with the ‘Gnostic’ temptation of an 
original dualism constituting the perennial forces that govern the world: ‘The 
prerationalist age is aware of the existence of two forces -God and the devil, life and 
death, light and darkness, good and evil, reason and passion- which struggle for 
dominance of the world (Morgenthau 1946, 205)’.  
 
Morgenthau’s ambivalence on this matter may provide an explanation for some of 
the caricaturing or mislabelling of his political ethics. Critics such as Michael Smith 
(1986, 135-137) and Michael Loriaux (1992: 416) have argue that the centrality of 
animus dominandi and the ubiquity of evil in Morgenthau’s thought evacuates 
effective individual moral responsibility (see also Klusmeyer 2009). This is 
admittedly a misleading remark if one takes into account that most of Morgenthau’s 
work is geared towards the salvation of human agency and the exercise of political 
wisdom as a form of ethical action amidst the contingent temporal and spatial 
circumstances that make up political life (Molloy 2009; Murray 1996). Morgenthau 
is at pains to stress that there is only one universal moral code applied across 
individuals and collectivities and that no political expediency justifies the application 
of double moral standards. However, there is some truth to the criticism that 
Morgenthau never managed to justify satisfactorily the nature of his political ethics. 
This is, I argue, a result of his failure to sustain the difference between an 
ontological and an ethical dualism in his ethico-political discourse. Although it 
would indeed be wrong to call Morgenthau a full-fledged ‘Gnostic’, Roger Epp 
(1991, 25) is right to attribute Morgenthau’s ambiguity to his lack of theological 
skills.11 For Epp, Morgenthau’s ersatz concept for sin expressed in secular terms as 
an insatiable lust for power shapes the human condition prior to any meaningful 
realm of freedom.  
 
                                                 
11 This is a remarkable claim not only because it proves the Schmittian point about the relevance of 
theological notions in politics but also because it reveals the crucial role of theology as such in 
providing the symbolisms and an effective, time-honoured vocabulary to think through the dilemmas 
of politics and the structure of experience (see Ricoeur 1967). 
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It is here that Morgenthau’s emphasis on the ‘ubiquity of evil’ in political life may 
rightfully sound disarmingly pessimistic (Morgenthau 1945) or overly romantic 
(Morgenthau 1962). That political action is bound to fail or that it necessarily, ab 
initio, carries the mark of its own corruption is one thing but the attribution of that 
failure to an ontological necessity of evil is quite another. The former may still allow 
for a residual human responsibility and capacity for justice despite or even through 
the tragic conditions that beset human existence (ethical dualism); the latter locates 
tragedy in the irreconcilable dichotomy between an a priori fallenness of actual life 
and a transcendental realm of ethical norms that are recognised but dismissed as not 
directly applicable to actual life (ontological dualism). In the absence of any creative 
dialectical overcoming of this opposition ethical dualism may easily regress to an 
ontological one. The claim here is not that Morgenthau does not have a concept of 
moral responsibility or that he programmatically opts for nihilism. On the contrary, 
he laments and fights this tendency in modernity (Frei 2001, 141-3). The criticism is 
that because he does not explicitly differentiate between human freedom and finitude 
his ethical dualism runs the danger of imperceptibly sliding into an ontological one. 
As a result anthropological pessimism or heroic fatalism is more likely to cripple his 
political ethics (see Morgenthau 1961, 234; compare with Rice 2008, 285-9 and 
Levine 2012, 120-135). As Roger Epp (1991:19) rightfully remarks, ‘[a] great gulf 
separates this attitude from Niebuhr’s contention that despair was the fate of those 
realists who knew something about sin, but nothing about redemption’. 
 
Despite Morgenthau’s ambivalence, however, it would be misleading to equate the 
premises of his political theology with Schmitt’s more explicit indebtedness to 
‘Gnostic’ thought patterns and their anthropological implications. Schmitt (2006) 
believes that there are two kinds of political theories: those ones that presuppose a 
conception of human nature as evil and take original sin seriously; and those ones 
that either gloss over this fact or deny it altogether imagining human nature as 
inherently good or positively malleable. Schmitt admits to a ‘pessimistic 
anthropology’ and claims ‘all genuine political theories presuppose man to be evil.’ 
(cf. Meier 1998, 80) In fact, expressed theologically, Schmitt’s anthropology is 
marked by original sin. Heinrich Meier (1995, 57) goes as far as to claim, ‘Original 
sin is the central point around which everything turns in [Schmitt’s] 
anthropological confession of faith.’ To be sure, to the old unresolved problem of the 
world’s imperfection in need of redemption, Schmitt may side with those theodicies 
that take original sin seriously; yet, his understanding of it sounds more ‘Gnostic’ 
than orthodox Christian. Schmitt’s political realism grounded on the friend/enemy 
distinction can be read as the secularisation of this theological concept but with a 
spin that sheds light on his ‘Gnostic’ interpretation of man’s evil nature.  
 
Indeed, Schmitt's unrelenting insistence on the evil of man in metaphysical rather 
than moral terms and on the loneliness and depravity of the world, in general, seem 
to validate his proximity to ‘Gnostic’ modes of thought (see Hohendal 2008).12 In 
                                                 
12 For a further substantiation of Schmitt’s ‘Gnostic’ tendencies, see here the excellent article by 
Hohendal (2008) and studies by Groh (1998) and Manemann (2002). Schmitt himself was convinced 
that the implantation of the concept of enmity at the heart of the political could, in a sense, recalibrate 
the Catholic dogma towards what he termed the ‘intensification of Catholicism’ (katholische 
Verschärfung) (Wacker, 1994) which he understood as a form of radicalisation of the Catholic doctrine 
in line with his avowed decisionism. Excellent sources for Schmitt’s religious leanings and theological 
reflections are the two volumes of notes and ruminations from the years immediately after World 
War II, the Glossarium and Ex Captivitate Salus. For a Catholic response to the Manichean tendencies 
in Schmitt’s thought, see Gustav Gundlach’s critique in Lönne (1994). For an argument that 
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fact, Schmitt’s political theology cannot be sustained if the grounds of enmity -the 
metaphysics of the political- are not eventually located within the deity itself. 
Schmitt (2008) becomes aware of what his political theology necessitates in his 
response to Erik Peterson (2011), a theologian who questioned the meaningfulness 
of political theology on the grounds that the concept of the Divine Trinity runs 
against any recruitment of the idea of monotheism to legitimise either monarchical 
government or political authoritarianism. Schmitt replies to Peterson’s objection by 
transplanting enmity within the Christian Trinity: the unity of God includes the 
hostility between God the Father and God the Son (Hohendal, 2008: 16; Groh, 1998: 
160).13 This is far from a Catholic doctrine. If one divides the two persons of God 
into Christ the rebel who must turn against his Father, the work of redemption is 
dangerously subordinated to the priority of the political as expressed in Christ’s 
promethean defiance (Groh, 1998: 163). This assumption throws light on the specific 
character of Schmitt's katechontic political theology: its political perspective is not 
Christ the redeemer but the opposition of imperfect creation (secular history, the 
state) and redemption (eschatology as perpetually deferred) which, however, sounds 
alarmingly ‘Gnostic’.  
 
In contrast to Schmitt’s anthropology, Morgenthau does not subscribe to the 
Schmittian understanding of human nature as inherently evil. Thus, the ‘Gnostic’ 
temptation in Morgenthau does not arise from the endorsement of some 
programmatic human predilection towards conflictuality; rather, like in Augustine, 
human propensity to evil emerges as an outcome of frustrated love (Morgenthau 
1962). Yet, the gap that opens between a world surrendered to the will to power and 
the possibility of redemption in love is inexorable: ‘whatever he expects of the other 
world, [man] must leave this world as he entered it: alone’ (Morgenthau 1962, 251). 
The lack of a clear articulation of a theory of freedom of the will prior (not 
chronologically but ontologically) to man’s surrender to evil makes Morgenthau 
vulnerable to the ‘Gnostic’ temptation (expressed as secular Nietzcheanism in his 
thought, see Frei 2001) of a permanent disjuncture between a world destined to 
damnation and an impossible redemption.   
 
Overcoming ‘Gnosticism’ 2.0? Niebuhr’s realist political theology  
 
If Schmitt’s political theology exemplifies the strong allure of ‘Gnostic’ ontological 
dualism and Morgenthau’s inconsistencies in holding an ethically dualist doctrine 
while flirting with the ‘Gnostic’ temptation of a dualistic ontology, Niebuhr’s 
theological anthropology foregrounds realism’s ontologically monist credentials. To 
that extent, Niebuhr’s realist political theology emerges as a clear indictment of 
‘Gnosticism’s’ politics of purism and a creative reworking of Augustinian ethical 
dualism. In fact, Niebuhr’s realist pragmatism can be properly appreciated only if it 
is read through its theological presuppositions.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Schmitt’s Catholicism represented a special breed of German nationalistic Catholicism based on race 
rather than church universal, see Geréby (2008).  
13 Relying on an idiosyncratic interpretation of an aphorism by Gregory of Nazianzus, Schmitt (2008: 
123) asserts that ‘[a]t the heart of the doctrine of the Trinity we encounter a genuine political-
theological stasiology. Thus the problem of enmity and of the enemy cannot be ignored’. The 
ambivalence of the word stasis in Greek, meaning both tranquillity and political upheaval, allows 
Schmitt to establish Gnostic dualism as an almost inescapable existential predicament between forces 
who are enemies ‘by definition’ (both emphases in original) (2008: 125). 
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The key to unpacking Niebuhr’s anti-‘Gnostic’ political theology lays in his modified 
Augustinian outlook on original sin. Niebuhr’s ethical realism rests on the 
Augustinian interpretation of original sin as a lapsus of the human will. As 
mentioned earlier, for Augustine, sin is not a natural human handicap grounded in 
elemental human biology but a failure of the will due to man’s love for himself 
(cupiditas). Like Augustine, Niebuhr does recognise that the Christian concept of 
original sin belies an absurdity in the form of refusing to accept sin as a permanent 
taint on human nature, at the same time that it considers evil tendencies in human 
beings almost inevitable. Original sin then appears paradoxically to affirm both 
man’s ‘inherited corruption’ and individual responsibility. However, whereas, as we 
have seen, this ambiguity have proved almost unbearable to Augustine himself 
leading him to adopt a hereditary ‘Gnostic’-like grounding of human sinfulness, 
Niebuhr opted for a more dynamic understanding of the paradoxical human 
condition inspired by Kierkegaard’s existentialism (Niebuhr 1954; Patterson 1999, 
50). To escape ending up in the same bind as Augustine, he adopts Kierkegaard’s 
view that sin is neither a necessity nor an accident but a temptation that is 
intimately connected with the relation of sin to anxiety (Kierkegaard 1980). In that, 
he goes beyond his mentor Augustine’s belief in the fundamental depravity that 
taints humanity by birth moving perhaps closer to a semi-Pelagian position.  
 
Indeed, Niebuhr’s anthropology relies on the orthodox Christian doctrine of man as 
imago Dei, that is, as a creature that besides his animal nature shares with God 
certain transcendent qualities that enable him to overcome the limitations of his 
created nature. Although he does not share the ability to create out of nothing 
(creatio ex nihilo) he is nevertheless endowed by God with creative capacities and the 
ability to make moral choices. Because of this unique gift of freedom man is, for 
Niebuhr, a peculiar creature that always operates at the juncture of time and eternity 
sharing a bit of both. Niebuhr calls this duality of being simultaneously inside and 
outside nature ‘a vertical dialectic’ (Gilkey 2002, 16), meaning that man is at once 
physical and supernatural. This is not the Manichean dualism of a debased natural 
existence, on the one hand, and an exalted spiritual one, on the other. On the 
contrary, man for Niebuhr is a unified personality ‘caught in the tension of limited 
self and unlimited potential’ (Patterson 1999, 49). It is within this understanding of 
the paradoxical tension between finitude and freedom marking human existence that 
Niebuhr’s insistence on the sinfulness of all men should be read. Men are not 
condemned to sin because they are naturally deprived of the ability to do good; 
rather, because they willfully choose to do evil. The choice of evil is not a defect of 
nature but a perversion of his creative capacity into pride which according to 
Augustine is man’s forgetfulness of his dependence on God. Freedom leads to sin 
because man seeks security by his own efforts. This view is best summarised by 
Niebuhr’s (1943, 80) Augustinian remark: ‘where there is history at all there is 
freedom, where there is freedom there is sin’.   
 
However, the fact that sin is a fundamental part of the human condition does not 
mean that evil resides ‘in some sloth of nature which man has inherited from his 
relation to the brute creation’ (Niebuhr 1941, 246). On the contrary, Niebuhr (1964, 
38) believes that men are ‘egoists in contradiction to their essential natures’. It is sin 
not finitude that begets evil and sin is to deny the anxiety that comes from man’s 
finitude (the fact that man is a created being). That is why it is not attending to the 
reality of human limitations that reduces evil, for Niebuhr, but adopting the correct 
attitude towards those limitations (repentance is never separated from hope). In that 
sense, properly understood, Niebuhr’s ‘Christian realist claim that there are no limits 
 Page 15 of 22 
 
to our moral achievements within history is not an invitation to pride but to politics’ 
(Lovin 1995, 157). My claim is that Niebuhr can credibly support this case because 
his theology is one of eschatological hope. It comprehends the tragedy of the human 
condition not as the effect of an inexorable fate or the unbridgeable gap between our 
transcendent ideals and a less than perfect and complex reality (ontological dualism) 
but as a result of the contradictory relationship between human freedom and its 
demonic tendencies (ethical dualism). 
 
Niebuhr has too often been branded a pessimist. His popular image was that of a 
realist Protestant theologian that never failed to remind us: ‘Man’s story is not a 
success story’.14 Indeed, Niebuhr’s theology was strongly influenced by the 
negativity of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross as an image of judgment upon all human 
success stories. However, it would be a crudity to label Niebuhr a pessimist, not least 
because designations such as ‘optimist’ or ‘pessimist’ would not faithfully depict his 
complex but ultimately orthodox Christian theology. As Douglas Hall (1998, 51) 
observes ‘this assessment…is the judgment of little minds for whom the facile 
alternatives of optimism and pessimism are substitute for more mature categories of 
analysis’. What is mistakenly taken to be an expression of pessimism or even 
fatalism is Niebuhr’s anti-purist spirit that refuses to accept the liberal-Renaissance 
naiveté of the constant virtuousness of humanity at the same time, however, that he 
negated the view of history and earthly politics as ubiquitously evil. Critics are often 
mislead by the stark opposition between the individual ethics of perfection and the 
violent ethics of coercion that one finds in Niebuhr’s early work, Moral Man and 
Immoral Society. Indeed, in this book Niebuhr approximates the neo-orthodox spirit 
of the otherworldliness of religious commitments as a reaction to Social Gospel’s 
misplaced optimism. However, ever since the publication of Reflections on the End of 
an Era, Niebuhr moved away from what resembled the near irrelevance of the 
Christian ethic of love for public life towards a more dialectical attitude that 
recognises the operation of the ideal in the real (Erwin 2013; Naveh, 2002).15 It is 
often forgotten by all those who describe his theology as unquestionably neo-
orthodox that volume II of his The Nature and Destiny of Man calls for a synthesis of 
Reformation and the Renaissance conceptions of man and history (see Shinn 1974, 
411). For Niebuhr (1943, 207), despite the fact that we all operate in sin and that 
competition is never between the sinners and the righteous but between sinful men 
of varying degrees, we must learn from the Renaissance that ‘life in history is filled 
with indeterminate possibilities’ and that men in history are faced with the 
responsibility to realise them even while with Reformation we know that only grace 
can be the answer to the corruptibility of human achievements.           
 
The foundation of Niebuhr’s pragmatic spirit is actually this dialectical tension 
between contrition and hope, Reformation and Renaissance. His pragmatism then 
has to be read not as disarming scepticism or middle-way accommodationism; rather 
it should be approached through its theological underpinnings as fidelity to 
                                                 
14 That was the caption under the portrait of Reinhold Niebuhr set against the backdrop of a 
turbulent stormy landscape with a cross on the horizon that appeared on the cover of Time 
magazine’s 25ht anniversary issue. It reveals a great deal about the ambiguous power of images to 
vividly illustrate a point at the same time they distort it. 
15 Naveh calls this attitude ‘non-utopian liberalism’ while Erwin describes Niebuhr’s effort to combine 
prophetic judgement with eschatological hope as ‘in the battle and above it’ alluding to the Pauline 
injunction that Christians should be in the world but not of this world. For good analysis on what 
Halliwell (2005) describes as Niebuhr’s ‘untidy dialectic’ between poet, prophet and statesman, see 
articles by Mac McCorkle, Ian Markham and Robin Lovin in Harries & Platten (2010). 
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Augustine’s dialectical paradox of the original sin: a constant oscillation and tension 
between an essentialising ‘Gnosticism’, on the one hand, that denies individual 
responsibility for evil and Pelagian optimism, on the other, that thinks of moral 
action as unencumbered by the circumstances within which it is born and which 
conditions it. On this point, Niebuhr’s eschatology differs markedly from the 
Barthian variant of neo-orthodoxy as well. Niebuhr is cautiously keeping a distance 
from Barthian otherworldliness while affirming a positive resolution of the human 
paradox of freedom that comes closer to Paul Tillich’s affirmation of the historical 
world. As for Tillich, although the Unconditioned cannot be bound by any period of 
time, yet it can be possible because a kernel of it is always already there, so for 
Niebuhr (1943, 291) although worldly powers are always transitory and the object of 
God’s sovereign judgement, history is filled with endless possibilities for the 
realisation of human creative potentials: 
 
Against utopianism the Christian faith insists that the final consummation of history 
lies beyond the conditions of the temporal process. Against other-worldliness it 
asserts that the consummation fulfils rather than negates the historical process. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have demonstrated how interpreting realist political theology as a 
Schmittian or strictly neo-orthodox project narrates half of the story. Undoubtedly, 
Schmitt exercised a strong influence on realist conceptualisations of political power 
as restraining force preventing social chaos. Yet, describing the realist project as an 
extension of Schmittian political theology is associating realism too closely with 
‘Gnostic’ tendencies in the neo-orthodox movement with which Schmitt’s project of 
‘intensification of Catholicism’ seemed to coincide but which contained only part of 
the tensions that Augustinian political realism grappled with. In fact, the radical 
break between transcendence and immanence that both Schmitt and Barthian neo-
orthodoxy announce in their work does not sit easily with the dialectical paradox of 
sin and responsibility in Augustine’s thought which prominent realists such as 
Morgenthau and Niebuhr shared and sustained in a greater or lesser degree.  
 
That said, realism’s struggle with ‘Gnosticism’ is not a story of victory or defeat but 
a tale of constant wrestling against the ‘Gnostic’ temptation. To the extent that 
Morgenthau’s and Niebuhr’s thought is a peculiar mixture of Schmittian, neo-
orthodox and Augustinian elements their thought also exhibits the ambiguity and 
uneasy compromise between ‘Gnostic’ dualism and more dialectical forms of 
orthodox Christianity. The picture here is a lot more complicated than simply 
representing realists as defenders of some form of Christian orthodoxy. Gershom 
Scholem once astutely observed that ‘Gnosticism’ is not simply a heretical deviation 
from the orthodox dogma but ‘a constantly self-repeating structure within religious 
thinking’ (cf. Wiese 2007, 65). The ‘Gnostic’ impulse in religious thought emanates 
from the human being’s struggle to balance two contradictory injunctions: the co-
existence of evil with an omnipotent and benevolent God. By studying realism, then, 
as anti-‘Gnostic’ tragic theology, we gain a better understanding of the theological 
background to the realist tragic vision of politics. This vision, if understood as an 
attempt by Augustinian realists to grapple with the problem of evil and position 
themselves vis à vis the Augustinian paradox of the original sin, may in turn explain 
the kind of pragmatism realism advocated. Not an untroubled pragmatism of the 
Deweyan persuasion, but a theological pragmatism steeped in the doctrines of sin 
and tragedy; concerned not with offering compromises but rather with keeping the 
 Page 17 of 22 
 
paradox of human existence free from enslavement to idolatrous totalitarianisms of 
any spiritual or political kind.    
 
Reading realist ethics as a struggle against ‘Gnostic’ tendencies may also help 
explain the reasons behind the frequent misinterpretation or abuse of realist 
thought. As it became apparent from the allusions to the powerful drive towards 
‘Gnostic’ dualism, the dialectical element or rather the creative tension that realists 
advocated between the imperatives of power and morality is hard to sustain. 
Inevitably, critics tended to see them as either hard-nosed power politics figures as 
well as apologists of violence and imperialism legitimising the Cold War politics of 
the American superpower or as non-gratifying moralists advancing a moral 
skepticism that leads to unbelief and inaction. However, politics for the realists is an 
exercise of power but not in moral vacuum. Moral action is condemned to take place 
in an always already structured (corrupted) environment but not because the created 
world is inherently evil or history the site of man’s inevitable debasement. Rather, 
because humans enter a world already structured by sin as a dark involuntary in the 
heart of human will and marked by habitual cowardice and impotence to counteract 
it. Dissociating human finitude from sin enables eschatological hope to shine even in 
the middle of a despairing reality as the promise of the ideal in the actual. Yet, to 
offset a naïve idealism that interprets history as moving towards the progressive 
approximation of an ideal reality, realists take the self-contradicting power of 
freedom and the demonic tendencies in history seriously. Eschatological hope 
presupposes repentance and contrition if it is to inspire progressive activism as 
opposed to otherworldly quietism or hollow utopianism and political messianism. 
Realist political theology teaches us how important it is to nurture the dialectic of 
humility and hope. 
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